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ABSTRACT 
FINANCIALLY MOTIVATED LMP MANIPULATION BY AGGREGATORS 
IN POWER MARKETS 
by 
Chaoyi Chen 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2019 
Under the Supervision of Professor Lingfeng Wang 
 
 
Renewable energy accounts for a sizeable share within modern power systems and aggregators 
of renewable generators play an important role in the electricity market. However, because 
renewable generators produce power intermittently, it is hard to monitor and supervise the 
behavior of the aggregators. There is a chance for aggregators to manipulate the locational 
marginal prices (LMPs) in the power market by curtailing generation in order to increase their 
profits. 
 
In this thesis we propose a tri-level model that can quantify aggregators’ potential profits. This 
model is based on both a real-time optimal dispatch and an LMP clearing procedure. With this 
model, the relationship between curtailment of generation and profits of aggregators was studied 
by using different backup generators in an IEEE 14-bus power system. At the same time, we found 
the most profitable point at which aggregators curtail generation. We also used the same IEEE 14-
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bus power system to devise a resilience strategy to keep LMPs steady throughout the whole power 
system. This resilience strategy led to a decline in aggregators’ motivation to manipulate LMPs in 
power markets. 
 
In the study, we show that the aggregators can increase their profits through the curtailment 
of generation and this behavior can lead to significant LMP changes in the whole power system. 
The profit of aggregators can be different when the independent system operators (ISOs) use 
different generators to make up the financially motivated curtailment. Further, this thesis shows 
that aggregators have the potential to conduct financially motivated LMP manipulation in the 
power market and it can push ISOs to improve the related management rules. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
1.1.1 Modern Power System with Renewable Energy 
Power systems are grids to supply, transfer and use electricity. Traditional power systems are 
mainly composed of three parts: generation, transmission, and distribution system, in which the 
power generation is centralized. There are only few large power plants, including thermal power 
plants, hydropower plants, and nuclear power plants [1]. Electricity flows from generation systems 
to distribution systems through transmission lines. Most generation plants can be controlled. 
 
With the development of technology and the more attention on renewable energy, modern 
power systems develop fast now. Generation units can be found in the distribution system, which 
is not centralized but distributed, including fuel cells and photovoltaic panels. However, because 
renewable energy power generation is intermitted, it is hard to be monitored and controlled.  
 
1.1.2 Renewable Energy Aggregators 
In the power system, it is hard to keep the balance of load demand and energy supply. 
Individual renewable energy generators cannot fulfill the need for distribution flexibility and safety. 
Instead, renewable energy aggregators can solve this problem. They are entities that aggregate the 
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load or generation units and in order to optimize the energy supply and power consumption 
technically and economically. Renewable energy aggregators aggregate in control decentralized 
renewable energy units to avoid system imbalance and push the development of renewable energy. 
 
However, as for the aggregators, creating the algorithm of managing renewable energy in 
different places is difficult. From the perspective of the system operators, it is hard to monitor the 
power market with aggregators and reduce the market power of aggregators. Different from the 
traditional generation source, the generation controlled by aggregators cannot be verified. The 
unavailable time for generation in solar power plants cannot be scheduled or verified after the fact. 
Therefore, aggregators have the chance to curtail generation for manipulating bus prices and 
making profits without being noticed by the ISO [2]. 
 
1.1.3 Power Market Operation 
Electricity is a special type of tradable product. It is used and produced simultaneously and 
the generation must meet the load demand exactly in the power grids. ISO (independent system 
operator) and RTO (regional transmission organizations) are responsible for the balance. They 
forecast and plan generation to ensure sufficient generation. There are nine ISOs and RTOs in 
North America which are noncommercial organizations and they manage the energy market. They 
are ‘day-ahead market’ and ‘real-time market’ respectively and both of them based on using 
3 
 
locational marginal price (LMP) [3]. In the day-ahead market, the generators submit their bids to 
ISOs and RTOs, based on varying costs for each hour or next operating day [4]. In the real-time 
market, ISOs and RTOs manage the changes of production and consumption throughout the day 
[4].  
 
ISOs and RTOs optimize generation dispatch schedule considering system energy price, 
transmission congestion cost and the cost of marginal losses [5]. It was committed by all the market 
participants with the locational marginal price (LMP) which varied at each bus in the power grid 
based on the published prices from ISOs and RTOs. In the real-time market, the system operators 
dispatch generation to each generator based on the real-time system operating conditions [6]. 
Accordingly, generation and load are priced at each node in the grid. 
 
1.1.4 Economic dispatch 
In power system, generators should always response to the changes in load because they need 
to keep balance at all the time. Therefore, it is necessary to adjust the output of aggregators 
frequently. The aim of economic dispatch is to minimize the operation cost of the whole power 
system through determining the generation output from each generator [7]. The costs of producing 
a unit of electricity are different among generators and it also costs differently for the loss when 
they send generation to the load. The process of economic dispatch runs every few minutes to 
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choose the combination of generator set points that minimizes the whole cost and it is also subject 
to the line limits and generators’ capacities [8]. 
 
In this thesis, because the generation at one bus was curtailed, other generators must produce 
the same amount of power to meet the same load demand. Therefore, ISOs should do the economic 
dispatch after the curtailment. We did not consider network loss and only minimized the cost of 
generating. 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
1.2.1 Arbitrage Study in Power Market 
The model in this thesis is strongly connected to the research about financially motivated price 
manipulations in power market. In the paper [9], researchers studied aggregators’ strategic 
behavior in the power market and proposed that aggregators can chase their profits by choosing 
cost parameter. The oligopoly of aggregators may be detrimental to consumers. Study [10] 
indicates even though aggregators are beneficial to power systems, there is a possibility that they 
may abuse their market power. This paper proposed a pricing scheme that encourages aggregators 
to act in a socially optimal manner and aggregators’ profits are under supervision.  
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As for the resilience strategy, reference [11] proposed an optimal bidding model that can keep 
power prices steady for avoiding the risk of profit loss. Researchers in [12] studied the uncertain 
market prices and used CVaR to manage the risk of aggregator participation. Study [13] shows a 
game theoretic model that studied the competition between aggregators and DSOs to maximize 
the profits of all units in the power market.  
 
This thesis also has close relationship with cyber security in power market which studies how 
a malicious party manipulates prices and realizes arbitrage by injecting false data to the power 
systems [14]-[20]. Researchers in the studies [14], [18] and [19] indicate the malicious parties can 
attack the sensor data and compromise the state measurement in the power system which can bring 
profits to them. Articles [15] and [16] show that these attacks can influence both system security 
and power prices by causing line congestions. 
 
1.2.2 Economic Power Dispatch after LMP Manipulation 
In the modern power system, the consequences of malicious manipulations have received 
close attention to in recent years [21]-[22]. Many studies have proposed strategies that avoid these 
operations, but quickly reacting after the fact is also important. In [23], authors proposed an 
algorithm of managing distributed units based on neighborhood watch in order to solve economic 
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dispatch when the generators are compromised. Without a central coordinator, this method can 
perform a reliable distributed control and ensure the accurate control calculation. 
 
In this thesis, we adopted the traditional economic dispatch based on DC power flow model 
when the curtailment of generation happens and ignored the transmission loss. There are some 
research considering grid loss when solving economic dispatch problem. Jianxing et al [24] 
proposed a new economic dispatch model based on AC/DC iteration to reduce the transmission 
loss. 
 
1.2.3 Locational Marginal Price 
Locational marginal pricing is the main way in power market to determine the bus price which 
is influenced by line congestions. The author in [3] outlined the basic characteristics of both day-
ahead power market and real-time market. They also presented the fundamental LMP calculation 
which can provide effective price signals and support the network running in a reliable way. 
 
LMPs can be calculated by the simulation based on AC optimal power flow (ACOPF) or DC 
optimal power flow (DCOPF) [25]. Xu and Overbye [26] showed a LMP decomposition model 
based on ACOPF. Li and Bo [27] proposed a fictitious nodal demand model based on DCOPF to 
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calculate the LMP. Davari [28] presented an algorithm based on Two Point Estimate Method (T-
PEM) to calculate the mean and variance of LMP. 
 
1.3 Thesis Objectives and Contributions 
1.3.1 Research Objectives 
 To know clearly how the aggregator of distributed generators increases profit through 
financially motivated price manipulation. 
 Build a mathematic model to know the most profitable curtailment point for the 
aggregator and apply it into a power system. 
 Propose a resilience strategy to take precautions against the financially motivated 
curtailment and keep LMPs steady in the whole system. 
 
1.3.2 Summary of Contributions 
This thesis proposes the potential price manipulation through financially motivated generation 
curtailment by aggregators in the power market and a resilience strategy to take precautions against 
it. We use a tri-level mathematic model to optimize the extra profit of aggregators based on updated 
generation dispatch and LMP calculating.  
 
8 
 
After that, we apply the model into IEEE 14-bus power system and acquire the most profitable 
curtailment point for the aggregator. The result shows that after the curtailment, most LMPs in the 
system are changed. Also when the generators that make up the financially motivated curtailment 
are different, the profits of the aggregator are different. 
 
We assume that the aggregator does not know exactly which generators make up the 
curtailment and we use expectation strategy and robust optimization to conduct the most suitable 
generation curtailment point for the aggregator.  
 
In the end, we proposed using backup generators to keep LMPs steady when the curtailment 
happens and decrease the motivation for the aggregator to do the financially motivated generation 
curtailment. At the same time, we figure out the most suitable place to put the backup generators. 
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2 Tri-level Model of the Optimizing Curtailment Profit 
Aggregators can easily control the generation output in modern system which cause the 
possibility that they can curtail the generation from their units and lead to higher LMPs. Through 
this process, they can realize the arbitrage. In this section, we proposed a new mathematic tri-level 
model for simulating the financially motivated price manipulation process based on economic 
power dispatch and the calculation of LMPs. In this thesis, we assume the aggregator knows all 
information related to the power system, including network topology and state estimates. 
 
2.1 Structure of the Tri-level Model 
Aggregators play important roles in the development of constructing sustainable power grids. 
They provide interface points for ISOs to interact with distributed renewable generators and have 
a significant share in the power market. Therefore, the electricity market is easily influenced by 
the manipulation of aggregators. They have the chance to curtail the generation that belongs to 
them to heighten the LMP and make profits. 
 
The goal of curtailing generation is to maximize the increased profit of aggregators subjected 
to generation limitation, under the logical assumption that ISO will do the economic dispatch 
action to minimize the whole operation fee in the system based on the changed generation outputs. 
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A tri-level model shown in Fig. 2-1 is proposed to identify the relationship between the curtailment 
amount and the increased profit of aggregators.  
 
The upper level represents the aggregator and determines the generation vector to be curtailed 
in order to maximize the aggregator’s interest. Because the optimal objective function is 
nonconvex, i.e. it cannot be solved by common solvers, we adopted traversal search method to 
find out the most profitable curtailment point of generation. 
 
The independent system operator (ISO) in the second level problem optimally reacts to the 
changed generation output that has been successfully operated by the curtailment vector 
determined in the first level. In this thesis, the reaction only includes economic power redispatch 
because load shedding is costly and usually will not be used by ISOs. The aim of economic power 
redispatch is to minimize the system operating fee of the system under the balance of energy 
production and load demands. In our model, we adopted the traditional economic power dispatch 
only considering the generating fee and ignoring the transmission fee. 
 
As for the last level of the whole model, it is the algorithm that calculates LMPs based on the 
new generation dispatch. After the whole process, the new LMPs return to the first level and the 
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aggregator’s increased profit comes out. At the same time, the LMPs in the whole power system 
are changed by the aggregator. 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Tri-level model for price manipulation 
 
As in most LMP manipulation research of the electricity systems, we use DC power flow 
model to identify the behavior of the aggregators and system operators.  
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2.2 The Aggregator Behavior of the Generation Curtailment 
In the power system, aggregators play a role between generators and electrical customers as 
an individual part, collecting and selling power to residents, especially renewable energy. However, 
because of the complex and numerous renewable resource systems, it is not easy to regulate 
aggregators in the power market against making profits illegally [29]. Aggregators can curtail 
generation outputs on purpose and make their profit bigger than before without being noticed. It 
is possible to realize this change in profit because in the real-time market the LMP of the bus that 
aggregator manages is going to be higher with the strategy of curtailment even though its 
generation output decreases. Then there will be a big difference in their profits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2 The comparison of profits after the generation curtailment [2] 
 
ip  0  
 
i  
 
( *)i 
 
 
i  
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We assume the LMP at bus i monotonically increase with the generation decreasing at that 
bus which is controlled by the aggregators. In Fig. 2-2, (0)i  is the original LMP at bus i and ip  
is the original generation at bus i. *i  is the generation curtailment at which point the aggregator 
can get the maximum profit and ( *)i   is the corresponding LMP. The two shaded areas indicate 
the revenue that the aggregators get before and after the generation curtailment [2]. The difference 
between them is the extra profit through the generation curtailment [2]. If the yellow area is bigger 
than the blue one, the aggregator can acquire positive profits and the optimal generation 
curtailment happens at the point that the yellow area is the biggest [2]. 
 
In a power system, consider there are n buses and t transmission lines. We use p= [p1,…, pn]T, 
d=[d1,…, dn]T and f= [f1,…, ft]T to denote the generation outputs, loads and the flow of lines 
respectively. Assume the generation of node i can be managed by the aggregator. For not being 
penalized, the aggregator needs to limit his curtailment of generation by ε, which is denoted by 
αi, where 0≤αi≤ε. The aim of the aggregator is to maximize their profit difference caused by 
the generation curtailment and the first level of our model can be formulated as below: 
 
𝐌𝐚𝐱     ∑𝝀𝒊(𝒑𝒊 − 𝜶𝒊) − ∑𝝀𝟎𝒊 ⋅ 𝒑𝒊          
(𝟐. 𝟏) 
 
Subject to   0≤𝜶𝒊≤ε            (𝟐. 𝟐)      
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In the objective function (2.1), 𝝀𝒊 is the new LMP at bus i after the curtailment which can be 
obtained after the process of the third level model. ∑𝝀𝟎𝒊 ⋅ 𝒑𝒊 means the original profits of the 
aggregator and ∑𝝀𝒊(𝒑𝒊 − 𝜶𝒊) indicates the profits after the curtailment. The difference value of 
them is the increased profit of the aggregator. Both 𝜶𝒊  and 𝝀𝒊 are variables and the function is 
non-convex. Therefore, we use the traversal method to change the value of 𝜶𝒊 from zero to the 
upper limit curtailment of generation to realize the optimal problem. 
 
The cost change of generation is ignored in this model because in most cases the renewable 
generation cost is close to zero. It should be noted that the optimal result can be both positive and 
negative numbers. If it is positive, it means that the system is profitable for the aggregators. 
 
2.3 Economic Power Dispatch 
In the power system, when a generation output at a bus declines, other generators will make 
up the curtailment. If not, the system frequency will fall and it violates the strategy of the power 
system. At the same time, it is better to not shed loads because of the expensive fee. In this thesis, 
we use optimal power dispatch with limited generators and compare different combinations of 
available generators to make up the curtailment of generation to proof that the maximum profit 
point for the aggregator is not unique.  
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In this section, we assume bus i belongs to the buses at which the generators are controlled by 
the aggregators and bus l belongs to the buses at which the generators are available to make up the 
financially motivated generation curtailment. i is the curtailment that designed by the aggregator 
in the first level model. Therefore, in this level it is used as a constant. The aim of economic power 
dispatch is to minimize the generating cost of the whole system. The second level of our whole 
model can be written as below: 
 
 Min                   -                          (2.3)
l
l lc



  
   Subject to         =0                   (2.4) i l    
                             0                            (2.5)l   
                            ( )      (2.6)f G p d f     
                                                 (2.7)l lp Pg   
 
In the objective function (2.3), l  is the opposite value of the added generation output at 
bus l for making up the curtailment and lc  indicates the offer price of the generator at bus l from 
ISO. - l lc   means the new generating cost of the power whose amount is the same as the 
curtailment. 
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Constraint function (2.4) enforces the whole generation of the system unchanged to meet the 
load demand. Because l  is the opposite value of the generation output, all the values of them 
are less than zero in the function (2.5). In the constraint function (2.6), f  and f  indicate the 
lower and upper line limits and G∈Rt×n is the generation shifting factor matrix of the power 
system. d indicates the actual value of the load.   is a matrix of n rows and 1 columns including 
i  and l , and the other values are zero. After the financially motivated generation curtailment 
by the aggregators, the generation output of each bus can be denoted by p-  . Then the flow of 
lines can be denoted by f=G(p-  −d). In the constraint function (2.7),  lPg indicates the upper 
generation limit at bus l. 
 
2.4 LMP Model Based on Generation Curtailment 
In the power market, ISO acquires the real-time generation, load demand and flows of the 
system from the state estimation during every interval generation dispatch. Based on this 
information, ISOs minimize the total cost for operating the whole power system with an 
optimization model which can conduct the LMPs. The model for calculating the LMPs based on 
generation curtailment by aggregators can be written as below: 
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  Min                                                                           (2.8)T
p
c p

  
   Subject to        0                               ( )             (2.9) ip    
-                                                      ( , )      (2.10)p p p        
                            ( )     ( , )     (2.11)f G p p d f         
 
In the above functions, it should be noted that   is a constant matrix that obtained from the 
second level model and p   indicates the new power dispatch. In the objective function (2.8), 
p  is the change in power output for generators. Constraint function (2.9) keeps the whole 
generation of the system unchanged. In the constraint function (2.10), p  and p  indicate the 
lower and upper limits on the change of generations. Usually, we default ip =−2 and ip =0.1, 
i  [30]. Constraint function (2.11) ensures the flows are valid. Variables 
-, , R ,  , Rn t          are the dual variables (Lagrange multipliers) corresponding to 
function (2.9), (2.10) and (2.11). 
 
The locational marginal price of node i with the generation curtailment αi can be denoted by 
λi(α) as below: 
 
( - )      2.12LMP c B          （ ） 
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Here B∈Rn×t is the pseudo inverse matrix of G. 
 
In this thesis, we use the updated LMP based on the generation curtailment to conduct the 
profit of the aggregators. Therefore, we need to transform the function (2.8)-(2.11) into Lagrange 
form (dual form) for getting the value of Lagrange multipliers to calculate the LMPs. The 
transformed model can be written as: 
 
-Min          - ( ( - ) ) - ( ( - ) )       (2.13)
T T T Tp p G d p f G d p f               
Subject to    ( - ) 0                                                   (2.14)Tc G             
-                    , , , 0                                                                            (2.15)        
 
After the calculation of new LMPs, we can apply it into the first level model and get the 
increased profit of the aggregator at a certain curtailment of generation. Then we can use the 
traversal method to figure out the most profitable curtailment point of the aggregator. 
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3 Case Study 
In this section, we implemented the tri-level model mentioned in the section 2 in the IEEE 
14−bus power system which shows in Fig. 3-1 [31] to illustrate the financially motivated LMP 
manipulation process. We proposed 11 cases in which the available generators that make up the 
curtailment of generation are different. For each case, we figured out the most profitable point at 
which the aggregator curtail the generation. We also analyzed the power price fluctuation after the 
process. At the end we use both expectation value and robust optimization to conduct the most 
suitable curtailment point of the aggregator without knowing which case is used by the ISO. 
 
 
Figure 3-1 IEEE 14-bus power system [31] 
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3.1 Data Set 
As for IEEE 14-bus power system, in this thesis we only adopted the shifting factor matrix in 
MATPOWER and other data are set by ourselves for creating the congestions in the system which 
can influence locational marginal prices. In this way, the result we get will be more suitable to 
show the price fluctuations after the curtailment. 
 
The information we assume should be subject to the DC optimal power flow and other system 
constraint conditions. For minimizing the whole cost of generating in the system, we proposed a 
mathematic model to know the generation output of each generator based on the loads we set and 
other system information. It can be written as below: 
 
In this model, p is a variable. Function (3.2) keeps the balance of generations and loads. 
Function (3.3) limits the generation of each units. Function (3.4) keeps the power flows within 
𝐌𝐢𝐧                            𝑐𝑇𝒑                                           (𝟑. 𝟏) 
 
Subject to       ∑(𝒑 − 𝒅) = 𝟎           (𝟑. 𝟐) 
 
      𝟎 ≤ 𝒑 ≤  iPg            (𝟑. 𝟑) 
     
f ≤ 𝑮(𝒑 − 𝒅) ≤  f
       (𝟑. 𝟒) 
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their bounds. After this process, we will use the obtained p as a constant into our main tri-level 
model. 
 
The information we set that are related to the power system is the values that are shown in 
Table 3-1, 3-2 and 3-3, including the generation outputs, original offer prices, generator capacities, 
loads, and line capacities. G and B in this system are shown i n appendix A. 
 
Bus 1 2 3 6 8 
Generation 
Output (MW) 
400 252 92 264 75 
Original Offer 
Price ($/MWh) 
20 25 28.7 25 35 
Generator 
Capacity (MW) 
400 500 400 500 400 
 
Table 3-1 System information- generation outputs, original offer prices and generator capacities 
 
 
Bus 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Load (MW) 75 100 50 120 60 100 70 
Bus 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Load (MW) 70 90 50 98 70 80 50 
 
Table 3-2 System information- loads 
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Line 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Line Capacity 
(MW) 
200 150 200 150 200 250 100 
Line 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Line Capacity 
(MW) 
150 150 250 200 150 200 250 
Line 15 16 17 18 19 20  
Line Capacity 
(MW) 
300 150 150 150 150 100  
 
Table 3-3 Line capacities 
 
In this thesis, we assume there is an aggregator that has the ability to control the generation 
output at bus 1 through curtailing the solar or wind generation, i.e. i=1. Also, we set the maximum 
limit of generation curtailment ε is 4 MW. 
 
3.2 Case 1 – All the Other Generators are Available 
Before the generation manipulation, the aggregator does not know which generator is 
available to make up the curtailment. In this section, we assume all the other aggregators are 
available, i.e. {2,3,6,8}l . Using the information in the 3.1 part we get the relationship between 
the curtailment of generation at bus 1 and the new LMP at bus 1, which is shown in Fig. 3-2. Based 
on the LMPs, we can acquire the increased profit of the aggregator with the curtailment growing. 
It is shown in Fig. 3-3. 
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Figure 3-2 The relationship between LMP and curtailment – generators at bus 2, 3, 6, 8 are 
available to make up the curtailment 
 
 
Figure 3-3 Profit caused by generation curtailment – generators at bus 2, 3, 6, 8 are available to 
make up the curtailment 
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From Figure 3-2, we can see that without the curtailment, the LMP at bus 1 is 22.94 $/MWh 
which is different from the original offer price because there are some lines carrying their 
maximum flow and causing congestions. With the curtailment α increasing, the LMP at bus 1 
following rises monotonically in a staircase way. This is because if the binding constraints of the 
third level of our model keep steady, the dual variables corresponding to them do not change and 
the LMP keeps the same in this period [2]. However, when a constraint becomes binding/non-
binding, the LMP rises to another level [2]. 
 
In Fig. 3-3, it should be noted that the profit of aggregator decreases from the point that the 
LMP jumps to a new level. Because during the period the LMP keeps the same but the generation 
output decreases. From this conclusion, we can conduct that the most profitable point happens at 
the jump point of LMP. 
 
As for this case, we can see from the figures that when the aggregator curtail 2.21MW (from 
400MW to 397.79MW) power at bus 1, he can get 31.38×397.79-22.94×400 = $3306.57, which 
is a significant profit for the aggregator. After the financially motivated curtailment, the LMP at 
bus 1 increases from 22.94 $/MWh to 31.38 $/MWh.  
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However, the aggregator not only influences the LMP at node 1 but also other LMPs at 
different buses, which can cause a significant price fluctuation in the whole power market. Fig. 3-
4 shows the LMP differences at all the buses in the system before and after curtailing 2.21MW 
generation at bus 1. 
 
 
Fig. 3-4 The LMP changes at different buses after the curtailment – generators at bus 2, 3, 6, 8 
make up the curtailment 
 
From Fig. 3-4, we can see that the curtailment of generation at bus 1 causes most LMPs in the 
power system increased and only the LMPs at bus 4 and 5 decline. Because in our system, the 
original offer price at bus 1 is the cheapest. If the generation at bus 1 declined there must be other 
more expensive generators to make it up which causes the increasing trend in the LMPs.  
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From the results we get, it can be seen that the financially motivated operation of the 
aggregator can influence most of the LMPs in the system which can bring more profit for him. But 
at the same time, it may lead to an extra cost for running the whole power system or even cause 
some congestions and other problems to parts of the system. 
 
3.3 Case 2 –The Generators at Bus 3, 6, 8 are Available 
In this case, except for the generator at bus 2, we let all other generators in the power system 
be available to make up the curtailment of generation caused by the aggregator, i.e. {3,6,8}l . 
Fig. 3-5 shows the relationship between the curtailment of generation at bus 1 and the new LMP 
at the same bus based on the information mentioned in the 3.1 part. Fig. 3-6 shows the increased 
profit of the aggregator with the curtailment growth.  
 
 
27 
 
 
Figure 3-5 The relationship between LMP and curtailment – generators at bus 3, 6, 8 are 
available to make up the curtailment 
 
 
Figure 3-6 Profit caused by generation curtailment – generators at bus 3, 6, 8 are available to 
make up the curtailment 
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From the above figures, we can see that the trends of LMP at bus 1 and the profit of aggregator 
are similar with case 1. The most profitable point at which the aggregator curtails the generation 
also happens at the LMP jumping points because the LMP keeps the same value and the generation 
output at bus decreases. 
 
However, the value results in this case are totally different with the ones in case 1. It can be 
seen that in this case, when the aggregator at bus 1 curtail 0.65MW power, the maximum profit is 
only $614.83 compared with $3306.57 in case 1. LMP at bus 1 changes from 22.94 $/MWh to 
24.51 $/MWh which is much lower than 31.38 $/MWh in case 1 after the curtailment of generation. 
The only difference between case 1 and case 2 is the combination of generators of making up the 
curtailment is different. Therefore, there is also possibility that the aggregator cannot get 
substantial profit after the financially motivated LMP manipulation under specific economic power 
redispatch. 
 
As for the LMPs in the whole power system, it is the same with case 1 that most of LMPs are 
changed after the financially motivated curtailment at bus 1. Fig. 3-7 reports the LMP changes at 
different buses when the curtailment of generation at bus 1 is 0.65MW. 
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Fig. 3-7 The LMPs at different buses before and after the curtailment – generators at bus 3, 6, 8 
make up the curtailment 
 
However, the price fluctuation in the case is not as significant as case 1 even though most of 
them increase. Under this case, the influence of the financially motivated curtailment is not very 
serious. Therefore, we can see that the economic power redispatch plays an important role in this 
problem and it directly determines the profit of the aggregator. At the same time, the power 
redispatch influences the LMP changes in the system. For avoiding the significant price fluctuation 
in the power system, we proposed a resilience strategy that shown in detail in the next section.  
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3.4  Other cases 
In this section, we analyze the other 9 cases that are shown in Table 3-4. We did not consider 
the case that there is only one generator to make up the curtailment of generation at bus 1. Because 
in this way it will take the risk that the generator cannot fulfill the generation demand subjected to 
its capacity or line congestion will occur when doing the power redispatch. 
 
Case The buses at which the generators are available 
Case 3 2,  6,  8 
Case 4 2,  3,  8 
Case 5 2,  3,  6 
Case 6 2,  3 
Case 7 2,  6 
Case 8 2,  8 
Case 9 3,  6 
Case 10 3,  8 
Case 11 6,  8 
 
Table 3-4 Different cases 
 
  After applying the tri-level model to all the cases mentioned above with the information in 
3.1, we get the relationship between the curtailment of generation at bus 1 and the new LMP at the 
same bus which are separately showed in Fig. 3-8 – Fig. 3-16.  
 
31 
 
       
Figure 3-8 LMP changes– case 3                 Figure 3-9 LMP changes– case 4 
 
       
Figure 3-10 LMP changes– case 5               Figure 3-11 LMP changes– case 6 
 
       
Figure 3-12 LMP changes– case 7               Figure 3-13 LMP changes– case 8 
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Figure 3-14 LMP changes– case 9              Figure 3-15 LMP changes– case 10 
 
 
Figure 3-16 LMP changes– case 11 
 
From the above figures, we can see that the all the original prices at bus 1 is 22.94 $/MWh 
when there is no curtailment because the generation dispatch is the same in all the cases. The trends 
of the LMP at bus 1 in all the cases are the same with case 1 that it rises monotonically in a staircase 
way with the curtailment α increasing. However, when the curtailment of generation increases to 
its limit 4MW, the LMPs at bus 1 in all the cases vary from 24.51$/MWh to 31.38$/MWh. It 
should be noted that all the LMPs at bus 1 have changed after the financially motivated curtailment. 
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Based on the updated LMP at bus 1, Fig. 3-17 – Fig. 25 correspondingly show the increased 
profit of the aggregator with the curtailment growing in different cases. 
 
       
Figure 3-17 Profit changes– case 3              Figure 3-18 Profit changes– case 4 
 
      
Figure 3-19 Profit changes– case 5             Figure 3-20 Profit changes– case 6 
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Figure 3-21 Profit changes– case 7              Figure 3-22 Profit changes– case 8 
 
       
Figure 3-23 Profit changes– case 9                 Figure 3-24 Profit changes– case 10 
 
 
Figure 3-25 Profit changes– case 11 
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From the figures we can see that the trends of the increased profits of the aggregator are similar 
with the LMPs’ that rise monotonically in a staircase way with the curtailment of generation at bus 
1 increasing. However, the difference is that the profits decries after the jump points compared 
with the steady LMPs. The most profitable curtailment points are also at the LMP jump points. 
 
Based on all the results we get in the 11 cases, we organized the most profitable curtailment 
points of the aggregator and their profits by the financially motivated LMP manipulation. They 
are showed in Fig. 3-26 and Fig. 3-27. 
 
 
Fig. 3-26 The most profitable curtailment points in different cases 
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Fig. 3-27 The maximum profits of the aggregator in different cases 
 
Firstly, we can see that when the ISO uses different generators to make up the financially 
motivated curtailment of generation in our second model, the increased profits of aggregator vary 
from $609.93 to $3350.50. They are a big difference. However, it should be noted that in most 
cases, the profit of aggregator is significant.  
 
From Fig, 3-26, it can be seen that in most cases, when the curtailment of generation is around 
0.5MW, the aggregator can get the maximum profit. However, in 3 cases, the aggregator need to 
curtail more than 2MW to obtain the maximum profit. This figure also indicates that when the ISO 
adopts different power redispatch strategy, the aggregator needs to curtail different amount of 
generation at bus 1 to make significant profit. 
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3.5  The most suitable curtailment strategy 
In the last section, we already know the most profitable point for each case. But as for the 
aggregator, he does not know exactly which case is adopted by the ISO. Therefore, we need to 
conduct the most suitable curtailment point for the aggregator under this situation. In this section, 
we use two ways to solve this problem and they are expectation strategy and robust optimization 
respectively.  
 
3.5.1 Expectation Strategy 
We assume that the possibility for each case mentioned in the above section is totally equal, 
i.e. 1/11 1,2,...11cp c ， . Then, when the generation curtailment is  , the expectation value 
of the profit can be expressed as: 
 
     1,2,...11        (3-5)c cE p w c
   
 
Here, cw

 indicates the profit of the aggregator based on case c when the curtailment is  . 
Using this function, the expectation profit of the aggregator at different amount of curtailment 
generation can be conducted and it is shown in Fig. 3-28. 
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Fig. 3-28 The expectation profit of the aggregator with different curtailments 
 
In Fig. 3-28, it can be seen that the trend of aggregator’s profit is increasing with the 
curtailment of generation growing at bus 1. In this case, the most profitable point of the aggregator 
is when the curtailment of generation is 2.21MW and the expectation profit is $2069.23. 
 
3.5.2 Robust Optimization 
Robust optimization is another strategy for the aggregator considering how to curtail the 
generation. But it is somewhat conservative because they will choose the worst profit through all 
the cases when the curtailment is α. Afterwards, they can find the most profitable curtailment point 
from no curtailment to curtailing 4MW generation. It can be described as the function below: 
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0max         (mi 3- )n ( ) 6
S
p p

     
 
Here, S is the subset of the combination of all the 11 cases mentioned above. Fig. 3-29 shows 
the relationship between the aggregator’s profit and curtailment of generation with robust 
optimization. 
 
 
Fig. 3-29 The aggregator’s profit with different curtailments under robust optimization 
 
From Fig. 3-28, we can know that if the aggregator use robust optimization to determine how 
to curtail the generation, the best situation is that they can only get $609.2 when the curtailment of 
generation is 0.85MW. 
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3.5.3 Comparison 
Based on the results obtained in 3.5.1 and 3.5.2, in this part we can compare the two different 
strategies as Table. 3-5: 
 
Strategy Curtailment (MW) Profit ($) 
Expectation 2.21 2069.23 
Robust optimization 0.85 609.2 
Table 3-5 The compare of the expectation strategy and robust optimization 
 
From Table 3-5, it can be seen that the predicted maximum profit is totally different when the 
aggregator adopts expectation strategy and robust optimization. It is obvious that the last strategy 
is too conservative and it cannot suitably present the profit of aggregator because it uses the worse 
situation at each curtailment point. If the aggregator does not want to take risk, he may choose the 
robust optimization because if it curtails another amount of generation, there is possibility that it 
gets less profit than $609.2.  
 
Compared with the robust optimization, the first strategy is more reasonable to be considered 
by the aggregator. It considers the possibility of all the cases and deduces that maybe it can get 
$2069.23 at the end. From the comparison, we can also see that for the same problem, if the 
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aggregator adopt different strategies to assume their potential profit, the result has a significant 
difference.  
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4 Mitigation strategy against LMP manipulation by 
aggregators 
In the third section, we can see that in all the cases mentioned above, the aggregator can always 
get profits through the generation curtailment. In this section, we proposed using backup 
generators to make up the curtailment to take precautions against the financially motivated 
curtailment. The aim of the strategy is to decline the motivation of the aggregator to do it, i.e. no 
profit for the aggregator. Therefore, as for the system operators, they need to keep the LMPs steady 
even generations in the system change. We use function 4-1 to express: 
 
 
Here LMP' means the new LMP at all the buses in the system after the generation curtailment 
of the aggregator with the resilience strategy. 
 
As for the same system mentioned in the third section, we assume there is a backup generator 
whose capacity is 2MW and the cost of running it is 10 $/MWh at different buses. If it is under 
case 1 mentioned in the third section, i.e. all other generators can participate in the optimal dispatch, 
we need to know which bus is the best place to put the backup generator to realize our aim. Fig. 
4-1 shows when the generation curtailment is 4MW at bus 1, the results of function (4-1) when the 
backup generator put at different buses. 
min  || LMP' - LMP || 2     (4-1) 
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Fig. 4-1 The 2-norm of LMP changes 
 
From the figure, we can see that when the backup generator is put at bus 1, all the LMPs at 
different buses keep the same with original ones. In this case, the aggregator cannot get any extra 
profit. Also, if the system operator puts the backup generator at bus 5, the LMPs also keep steady 
and there is little profit for the aggregator when they do the generation curtailment. However, if 
the backup generator is at other buses, the LMPs will change a lot and there is a possibility for the 
aggregator getting profit. Therefore, the 1st and 5th buses are the most suitable places to put the 
backup generator and the LMPs keep almost the same with the original one. 
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5 Conclusion and Future Work 
Learning the possibility that aggregators of distributed generators can manipulate generation 
prices is crucial for the modern power market full of renewable energy. In this thesis, we use a tri-
level optimal mathematic model to prove that the aggregators can get profit through the curtailment 
of generation. This model shows the real-time optimal dispatch of the ISO and real-time locational 
marginal price calculating in the power market. We find the most profitable generation curtailment 
point of the aggregator through applying the model to the IEEE 14-bus power system. At the same 
time, most of the LMPs in the whole system are changed through the curtailment and the LMP 
increases at the bus that aggregators control with curtailment rising. 
 
As for the system operator, to avoid the financially motivated generation curtailment, we 
propose a resilience strategy to keep the LMPs steady in the whole system. We think this thesis 
helps to learn the power of aggregators in the power market and it can also be used to design the 
aggregation of renewable energy and distributed generators. From the results of this thesis, it 
should be noted that the system operators will be able to know how to solve this problem. 
 
For further research, we can analyze the price manipulation influence of more than one 
aggregator in the power system. At the same time, improving the productivity of renewable energy 
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in the power system and designing the market rules of managing aggregators are also crucial 
problems that need to be solved. 
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Appendix B 
Main Source Code 
 
clear all; 
clc; 
  
A = zeros(401,1); 
k=1; 
for dp1=0:0.01:4 
 
%% data 
delta_p_low=[-2;-2;-2;0;0;-2;0;-2;0;0;0;0;0;0]; 
delta_p_up=[0.1;0.1;0.1;0;0;0.1;0;0.1;0;0;0;0;0;0]; 
Pgen_A 
=[400;251.9174;92.2486;0;0;263.5010;0;75.3330;0;0;0;0;0;0]; 
d=[75;100;50;120;60;100;70;70;90;50;98;70;80;50]; 
G=makePTDF(case14);                                                                                                        
f_up=[200;150;200;150;200;250;100;150;150;250;200;150;200;250;30
0;150;150;150;150;100]; 
f_low=[-200;-150;-200;-150;-200;-250;-100;-150;-150;-250;-200;-
150;-200;-250;-300;-150;-150;-150;-150;-100]; 
c=[20;25;28.7;0;0;25;0;35;0;0;0;0;0;0]; 
  
B=[..]; //show in Appendix A, omitted here 
  
pmax=[400;500;400;0;0;500;0;400;0;0;0;0;0;0]; 
 
%% variables 
dp2=sdpvar(1,1); 
dp3=sdpvar(1,1); 
dp6=sdpvar(1,1); 
dp8=sdpvar(1,1); 
dp=[dp1;dp2;dp3;0;0;dp6;0;dp8;0;0;0;0;0;0]; 
 
%% functions 
OI = -c'*dp; 
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CI = [sum(dp(:))==0, 
    dp2<=0, 
    dp3<=0, 
    dp6<=0, 
    dp8<=0, 
    f_low<=G*(Pgen_A-dp-d)<=f_up, 
0<=Pgen_A-dp<=pmax]; 
 
%% approach 
option = sdpsettings('solver','cplex','savesolveroutput',1); 
Diagnostics_B = optimize(CI,OI,option); 
alpha=value(dp); 
  
%% variables 
lambda = sdpvar(1,1); 
lambda_p = sdpvar(14,1); 
lambda_n = sdpvar(14,1); 
mu_p = sdpvar(20,1); 
mu_n = sdpvar(20,1); 
 
%% functions 
Obj_B_du = delta_p_up'*lambda_p-delta_p_low'*lambda_n+(G*(d-
(Pgen_A-alpha))+f_up)'*mu_p-(G*(d-(Pgen_A-alpha))+f_low)'*mu_n; 
Cst_B_du = [c+lambda*ones(14,1)+lambda_p-lambda_n+G'*(mu_p-
mu_n)==0, 
    lambda_p>=0, 
    lambda_n>=0, 
    mu_p>=0, 
mu_n>=0]; 
 
%% approach 
option = sdpsettings('solver','cplex','savesolveroutput',1); 
Diagnostics_B_du = optimize(Cst_B_du,Obj_B_du,option); 
 
%% values 
LMP_B_du = c+value(lambda_p-lambda_n)+B*value(mu_p-mu_n); 
  
A(k)=value(LMP_B_du(1)); 
k=k+1; 
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end; 
 
The new LMP at bus 1 is in the matrix A. 
